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INTRODUCTION

President Bill Clinton signed the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)' into law on December 8, 1993.2 Many Congressional leaders
strongly opposed NAFTA, and the treaty narrowly passed in the House of

I would like to thank my mother for her support and encouragement.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can. [hereinafter
NAFTA]. NAFTA is an agreement between the United States, Mexico, and Canada that
creates a "free trade zone" between the three countries by reducing barriers to trade. Public
Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 550 (1993).
2. Ronald A. Taylor, Clinton signs NAFTA, looks to Global Pact, THE WASH. TIMES,
Dec. 9, 1993, at A4.
*
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Representatives. 3 The opposition expressed concerns that free trade between
Mexico and the United States would aggravate existing pollution problems
along the border between the two countries. 4 In response, President Clinton
pointed to the Environmental Side Agreement to NAFTA which was drafted
to alleviate those fears.5 According to Carol Browner, Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), NAFTA and its Environmental Side
Agreement mark the first time environmental issues have been included in
a major trade agreement.6 Further emphasizing its uniqueness, Vice
President Al Gore stated that the treaty broke new ground by addressing
environmental issues never before contemplated in trade agreements.7
NAFTA is unique among trade agreements because negotiations
involving both free-trade and environmental protection are inherently laden
with problems. The goals of each are often diametrically opposed, with
environmental regulations often amounting to non-tariff barriers to trade.'
Therefore, NAFTA represents a compromise between the competing goals of
maximizing natural resources for profit and protecting the environment.9
While NAFTA includes Canada, Mexico, and the United .States, this
Note focuses on its effectiveness between Mexico and the United States.
First, the Note describes the current pollution problem along the U.S.-Mexico
border. It then summarizes past and current laws and treaties involving
Mexico and the United States. Finally, the Note examines the inherent
benefits and defects of NAFTA and its Environmental Side Agreement, as
well as their projected impact on the current pollution problem along the
U.S.-Mexico border.
II.

POLLUTION

Over time, environmental problems along the border between Mexico and
the United States increased as the number of industrial plants in the region

3. Kelly McParland, Pulling NAFTA From the Brink: How, White House Brought Deal
Back From Near Death, THE FIN. POST, Nov. 20, 1993, at 14. Only 34 less votes were
required to defeat its passage. Id. The President made many promises to various
congressional members, including the purchase of two planes from one congresswoman's
district. Id.
4. Taylor, supra note 2. Representatives also expressed concerns that U.S. factories
would relocate to Mexico to avoid the more stringent U.S. environmental laws, thus resulting
in a loss of jobs to U.S. workers. Id.
5. Id.
6. Trade Pact Clears Senate 61-38, Clearing Measure For Clinton Signature, CHEM.
REG. REP. (BNA)(Nov. 26, 1993).
7. Press Conference with Vice President Al Gore, FED. NEWS SERV., Sept. 15, 1993
[hereinafter Conference with Gore].
8. Michael Prieur, Environmental Regulations and Foreign Trade Aspects, 3 FLA. J.

INT'L L. 85 (1987).

9. Id. at 90.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss3/8
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grew. These problems were often the result of neither Mexico nor industry
adequately providing for the disposal of toxic wastes that the many plants
generated.'0 Additionally, the existing infrastructure in the region was not
equipped to accommodate the large influx of people migrating to the border
in search of employment."
A.

The Border Pollution

The pollution along the U.S.-Mexican border is severe and a hazard to
both human health and the environment. In certain areas, millions of gallons
of untreated household and industrial sewage are dumped daily into ditches
which feed into the Rio Grande. 12 The 2000-mile border that Mexico shares
with California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas has been called a "virtual
cesspool."' 3
An example of the severity of the problem and the potential for toxic
injury occurred recently in the border town of Ciudad, Mexico. 4 A tenyear-old Ciudad native was hospitalized and then bedridden with third-degree
bums after playing in an ordinary-looking puddle of water. 5 Later, doctors
identified toxic chemical solvents as the source of her injuries."
In addition to the potential for toxic accidents in the region, border
residents' conditions are often deplorable. Most do not enjoy the comforts
of running water, electricity, or sewage.' 7 Many live in "colonias,". 8
storing their drinking water in barrels that once contained toxic solvents 9
and building their homes from scraps of wood once used as containers for
hazardous materials. 20 Residency in the "colonias" is not limited to
Mexican citizens - more than 280,000 Texans also live in these squalid
conditions.2'

10. Stephen M. Lerner, The Maquiladoras and Hazardous Waste: The Effects Under
NAFTA, 6 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 255, 258 (1993).
11. Michael J. Kelly, Note, EnvironmentalImplicationsof the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 3 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 361, 364 (1993).
12. Feeley & Knier, Environmental Considerationsof the Emerging United States-Mexico
Free Trade Agreement, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 259, 273 (1992).
13. Juanita Darling, Can Mexico Clean Up Its Act?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1991 at 1.
14. Todd Robberson, Mexicans Rage over Pollution, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1993.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Kelly, supra note 11.
18. Id.
19. Robert Suro, Border Boom's Dirty Residue Imperils US.-Mexico Trade, THE N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 1991.
20. Id.
21. Hearingof the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, EnvironmentalSide
Agreements of NAFTA, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 19, 1993 [hereinafter Hearing of Senate
Environment].
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TransboundaryPollution

Because pollution does not recognize international boundaries, the United
States has more than a casual interest in Mexico's environmental problems.
Pollution from the border region has found its way to the United States via
water, air, and land.22 After years of factories in the region indiscriminately
dumping toxic wastes and emitting hazardous fumes into the air, the region
suffers profound effects. 23 Rivers in the border region flow from Mexico
into the United States carrying raw untreated sewage and toxic industrial
pollutants from area factories.24 An increase in hepatitis -in Arizona and
Texas is directly linked to this outpour of toxins, 5 as is a high rate of
anencephalia 26 in Cameron County, Texas.
A contributing factor to the region's pollution is the inadequacy of
existing waste water treatment systems to deal with generated wastes.2 7
Industrial and human wastes are simply dumped into ditches which feed into
major rivers. 28 The rivers pick up more wastes as they flow through various
towns, eventually ending in Texas with a fecal contamination 1000 times
greater than the Texas limit.29 Thus, there is a danger that health and
environmental problems will only escalate, unless a method is developed to
decrease toxic, untreated discharges into rivers connecting the two countries.
Pollution also reaches the United States through the air. The primary
source of air pollution found in the U.S. border cities is from Mexico. 30 Air
pollution is a result of the emission of volatile organic compounds from the
industrial plants, and of from Mexican automobiles and trucks lacking
emission control devices.3 In addition, wastes burned at dump sites release
carcinogenic smoke into the United States. 32 Like water pollution, air
pollution may increase under NAFTA as both trade and population along the
border of Mexico and the United States increase.
The transportation of hazardous waste from the United States into
Mexico is another source of transboundary pollution. Hazardous waste
transport has become a growing illegal business as a "steady stream" of

22. Kelly, supra note 11.
23. Darling, supra note 13.
24. Suro, supra note 19.
25. Id.
26. Hearingof the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, FED. NEWS SERV.,
Mar. 15, 1993 (testimony of Senator Metzenbaum).
27. Kelly, supra note, 11,at 366.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 365.
31. Id.
32. Darling, supra note 13.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss3/8
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toxins are transported into Mexico to avoid stringent U.S. laws regarding
their disposal.33 Yet hazardous waste is also transported illegally into the
U.S from Mexico. For example, furniture manufactured in Mexico from a
scrapped x-ray machine was subsequently transported across the U.S.
border.34 Radioactive cobalt-60 from the machine was incorporated into the
furniture and would have gone undetected but for the fact it set off alarms
at a U.S. nuclear testing facility. 35 Since border traffic will increase as trade
increases, the illegal transportation of hazardous waste is likely to increase
in direct proportion.
The primary catalyst for border growth and subsequent environmental
degradation was the birth of the maquiladoras. 36 In 1966, in order to boost
its economy, the Mexican government launched the Border Industrialization
Program, known today as the maquiladoras.37 Considered economically
successful because it created hundreds of thousands of jobs for poor
39
Mexicans, 38 the benefits of the program have not come without a cost.
The maquiladoras generate a significant amount of toxic waste40 which
subsequently contaminates water and soil either through accidental spillage
or improper disposal. 4' In addition the maquiladoras may provide a
convenient means to illegally transport hazardous waste from the United
States into Mexico.42 Finally, the influx of people to the border area has
overwhelmed the existing infrastructure. Even sanitation services have been
able to keep up with the increase in population.43 The end result of these
factors is an increasingly hazardous and volatile environmental situation in
the border area.
The environmental situation in the border region is complicated by noncompliance with existing environmental regulations, lax enforcement by
Mexican authorities, and an inadequate infrastructure to effectively handle

33. Barbara Scramstad, Comment, Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste from
the United States to Mexico, 4 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 253, 256 (Spring 1991).
34. Robberson, supra note 14.
35. Id.
36. Lerner, supra note 10, at 258.
37. L. Gray Sanders, Note, Maquiladorasand the Yucatan, 5 FLA. J. INT'L L. 525, 527
(1990). The program allows foreign companies to locate in Mexico for assembly of
component parts and processing of raw materials. Id. at 525. The maquiladoras import
materials duty free and pay an export tax only on the value added from the work done in
Mexico. Id.
38. David Voigt, Note, The MaquiladoraProblem in the Age of NAFTA: Where Will We
Find Solutions?, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 323, 326 (1993).
39. Id.
40. Lerner, supra note 10, at 258.
41.

Id.

42. Elizabeth C. Rose, Comment, TransboundaryHarm: Hazardous Waste Management
Problems and Mexico's Maquiladoras,23 INT'L LAW. 223, 228-29 (1989).
43. Kelly, supra note I1, at 366.
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hazardous waste." These problems can be traced to the fact that Mexico
lacks sufficient economic resources to effectively handle environmental
issues.45 NAFTA and its supplemental Environmental Side Agreement are
projected as an economic answer to Mexico's problems. Studies indicate that
an increase in a country's wealth is proportional to a decrease in its level of
pollution. 6 In support of this proposition, Mexican officials assert that an
increase in their economy would aid improvement in their environmental
standards.4 7 Without NAFTA, there is little hope of any change occurring
along the U.S.-Mexico border.
III.

LEGAL -BACKGROUND

Although some of Mexico's environmental legislation resembles U.S.
environmental laws, in the past the Mexican government has lacked
enforcement power. Recently, Mexico has exhibited a commitment to higher
environmental standards and a willingness to correct the border problem.4"
Mexico's willingness to both strengthen and enforce its environmental laws
may have been due to its desire for the United States to approve NAFTA.4 9

44. Id.
45. Id. at 364. When the Mexican government created its environmental enforcement
agency it neglected to provide it with a budget. Randy Lee Loftis, Mexico Pushing
Environmentally Conscious Image; It's NAFTA InspiredHype, Investigatorsays, but There's
Some Real Progress, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Dec. 31, 1993. Exacerbating the problem,
many Mexican inspectors quit the agency after gaining experience to work at higher paying
factory jobs. Id. Those inspectors remaining lack sufficient training to effectively handle the
problem, while factory managers remain ignorant of illegal dumping. Id. In 1990, SEDUE
had a budget of $3.1 million compared to the $50 million that Texas alone spends on the
environment. Kelly, supra note 11, at 378. In addition, Mexico's inspectors in 1991 totaled
255, which is about the same number the United States employs just in the Los Angeles area.
Id.
46. James P. Duffy III, The Environmental Implications of a North American Free Trade
Agreement, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 561, 586 (1993).
47. North American Free Trade Agreement Greeted With Suspicion by Environmental
Groups, INT'L ENvTL. REP. (BNA)(Aug. 26, 1992) [hereinafter Suspicion]. Sergio Reyes
Lujan, President of the National Ecology Institute, and Santiago Onate Laborde, the
environmental Attorney General comment that a "healthier economy will make possible a
healthier environment." Id.
48. NAFTA Joint U.S.-Mexico Press Conference on Enforcement of Environmental
Regulations, FED. NEWS SERV., Nov. 2, 1993. In a recent press conference Mr. Santiago
Onate Laborde, Mexican Attorney General for Environmental Protection, described Mexico's
vision for its environmental future. As an example of Mexico's commitment to the
environment, he noted that in June, 1992, Mexico established the Office of the Attorney
General for Environmental Protection, which he now heads. Id. As a result of this new
agency 15,897 inspections were conducted in the last 14 months. Id. The outcome was the
subsequent closure of many plants which did not comply with environmental regulations. Id.
49. Todd Robberson, Mexico's EnvironmentalDilemma; Obstacles Abound to EnforcingTough Laws to Clean up Waste, THE WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1993. Some critics state that these.
acts are merely a facade because the government continues to use lax enforcement and poorly

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss3/8
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A.

The General Law

Mexico's environmental legislation is embodied in one far-reaching
environmental statute 1988 known as The General Law of Ecological
Equilibrium and Environmental Protection (General Law). 50 The General
Law regulates air pollution, water pollution, soil erosion, natural resources,
and hazardous waste.5 1 In 1982, to ensure compliance with the General
Law, Mexico formed the Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologia
(SEDUE), an environmental enforcement agency similar to the EPA. 2 Ten
years later, Mexico replaced SEDUE with the Social Development Secretariat
(SEDESOL)."3
The General Law requires each industrial plant comply with guidelines
regarding the generation, storage, transportation and disposal of hazardous
waste.54 SEDUE mandates that industrial plants obtain an operating license
and provide annual reports of their air emissions and wastewater discharges.55 In addition, industrial plants must document their movement of
hazardous waste. every six .months. 6 According to the General Law,
factories are required to send waste materials back to the country of origin,
except under three circumstances: when it may be destroyed, nationalized, or
donated to nonprofit organizations for resale.57 As lofty as these ideals
seem, records indicate that few plants comply with the exportation requirement.5 8 The main criticism of SEDESOL (and SEDUE pre-1992) has been
non-enforcement of Mexico's environmental laws.59
B. Previous Agreements Between Mexico and the United States
Agreements between Mexico and the United States regarding environmental issues are not new. In 1889, both countries agreed to form the
International Boundary Commission (IBC) to resolve boundary disputes over
trained inspectors. Id. However, Mexico increased the number of inspectors from 250 to 500
in the past three months and is expected to increase the number to 1000. Id. In addition,
Mexican officials imposed fines totalling over $300 million on polluters. Id.
50. Voigt, supra note 38, at 329-330.
51. Id.

152.
53.
54.
55.

Kelly, supra note 11, at 376.
Duffy, supra note 46; at 563.
Voigt, supra note 38, at 329.
Scramstad, supra note 33, at 276.

56. Id. at 277.
57. Id. at 277-78.

58. Id. at 271. The cost of dumping hazardous waste in Mexico is cheaper than disposal
in the United States Id. at 280. Legal disposal in Mexico is a fraction of the U.S. cost, and
illegal disposal is free. Id. Mexico's sanctions for such activity are perceived as more lenient
than the U.S. sanctions, so the activity continues. Id.
59. Id. at 279.
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waters. 60 A 1944 treaty then changed the name of IBC to International
Boundary and Water Commission, 6' expanding the Commission's powers
and charging it with the authority to address water quality and sanitation
along the border.62
In 1978, the U.S. EPA and the Subsecretariat for Environmental
Improvement of Mexico signed a Memorandum of Understanding 63 which
committed both parties to "a cooperative effort to resolve environmental
problems of mutual concem in border areas."' In addition, the Memorandum suggested that the parties develop pollution abatement and control
65
programs.
In 1983, the La Paz Agreement 66 superseded the Memorandum to
specifically address current environmental problems in the border area.67
Still in effect, the Agreement's purpose is to unite the national environmental
agencies of the United States and Mexico in coordinating and developing
environmental policies. 68 The general goal of the agreement is environmental protection along the border of the United States and Mexico.69 Overall,
La Paz sets out general provisions and outlines for cooperation between the
two countries,70 while addressing the border area's specific environmental
problems in subsequent annexes. 7'
The La Paz Agreement is criticized principally for its lack of binding
force. It is conspicuously lacking in enforcement provisions and is qualified
by language such as "to the fullest extent possible," and "subject to the
availability of funds. 72 In response, the environmental community proposed
solutions to remedy the defects in La Paz. 73 Among the proposed solutions

60. Id. at 260.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 261.
64. Id. (quoting 1978 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Subsecretariat for
Environmental Improvement of Mexico and the Environmental Protection Agency of the
United States for Cooperation on Environmental Programs and Transboundary Problems, June
19, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 1574, T.I.A.S. No. 9264, I (exchange of notes)).
65. Id..
66. Agreement Between the United States and Mexico on Cooperation for the Protection
and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S.
No. 10,827 (signed at La Paz, entered into force Feb. 16, 1984)[hereinafter La Paz].
67. Duffy, supra note 46, at 573.
68. La Paz, supra note 66.
69. Voigt, supra note 38, at 332.
70. Id. at 332-33.
71. Id. Annex I addresses sanitation problems at the border, Annex II provides a legal
and procedural framework to the shipment of hazardous waste, and Annex IV and Annex V
limit and manage air pollution. Id. at 333-36.
72. Id. at 337.
73. Albert E. Utton, Protecting the Environment in the Mexico-U.S. Border Region, I
U.S.-MEx. L.J., 211, 213 (1993).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss3/8
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include the establishment of an Environmental Commission with the authority
to both establish and enforce standards.74 It also is suggested that the
United States and Mexico negotiate an Environmental Agreement as a
supplement to La Paz." Proponents of such an Agreement contend it
would provide for more coordination, cooperation, communication and
funding for the border area.76
Another important agreement entered into by Mexico, the United States,
The primary
and over 100 other countries is the Basel Convention."
objective of the Basel Convention is to prohibit industrialized nations from
transporting their hazardous waste to lesser developed countries. 78 According to the Basel Convention, countries may only export wastes if they do not
have the technical capability to dispose of the wastes in an environmentally
safe manner.79 In addition, the exporting country is prohibited from
transporting waste if it believes the receiving country could not guarantee an
environmentally safe disposal of the waste.80 A further provision prohibits
a country from importing hazardous wastes into its territory if it believes the
waste will not be disposed of in an environmentally safe manner.81 While
not a complete ban on exporting hazardous wastes, the Basel Convention
encourages a free exchange of information and technology, and encourages
each country to assume responsibility for its own waste. 2 Ideally, the
Convention will make the transboundary movement 6f hazardous waste so
costly that countries will begin disposing of their own waste. 3
IV. NAFTA AS A SOLUTION
Environmental and congressional leaders expressed concern that the
signing of NAFTA would lower United States environmental standards or
would impose restraints on U.S. environmental laws.84 The primary goal

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal, adopted and opened for signature Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649,
reprinted in the United Nations Environmental Programme, Basel Convention on the Control
of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal: Final Act [hereinafter
Basel Convention].
78. Scramstad, supra note 33, at 281.
79. Duffy, supra note 46, at 585.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Scramstad, supra note 33, at 282.
83. Id. at 282-83.
84. Sanford Gaines, The NAFTA: Labor Rights, Environmental Protection and the
Supplemental Agreements; Environmental Laws and Regulations after NAFTA, 1 U.S.-MEx.
L.J. 199 (1993). The author, Sanford E. Gaines was the Deputy Assistant Trade Repre-
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of NAFTA is to create a free-trade zone that promotes economic growth
through expanded trade and investment opportunities.8 5 Environmental
groups opposed the idea of a free-trade zone without any environmental safeguards. 86 In order to limit opposition, President George Bush included
some non-governmental organizations (NGO) in the trade policy advisory
structure. 87
This move split the environmental movement, with some environmental
groups supporting NAFTA, and others opposing it as inadequate and in need
of more environmental provisions.8 8
One commentator has labelled NAFTA "the greenest ever" free trade
agreement. Previous agreements, however, have rarely addressed environmental issues.89 Proponents of NAFTA state it will benefit the environment
of all three signator countries, 90 yet the treaty never addresses specific
environmental concerns. NAFTA does, recognize environmental concerns in
several of its general provisions however, thus displaying a commitment to
environmental issues, albeit without any regulatory force.
This note provides insight into NAFTA's provisions as they relate to
environmental concerns. First, it discusses the Preamble which states the
overall environmental objectives of the signing parties. 9' Next, it considers
Article 104 because this provision recognizes prior treaties between the
United States and Mexico.92 Then, it examines Chapter 7, the provisions
which govern food and pesticide regulation, 93 and next Chapter 9, the
provisions which control all other product related measures.94 Then it

sentative for the Environment Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.
under President Bush. Id.

85. Freely & Knier, supra note 12, at 263. Willard Workman, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce International Vice President, stated that the agreement will create a free-trade zone
of 360 million consumers, with an annual output of more than $6 trillion rivalling the
European Community. Suspicion, supra note 47.
86. Suspicion, supra note 47.

87. Gaines, supra, note 84, at 200. President Bush appointed Russell Train of the World
Wildlife Fund. Carla Hills, U.S. Trade Representative, appointed John Sawhill, President and
CEO of the Nature Conservancy and former Secretary of Energy; Peter Berle, President of the
National Audubon Society; John Adams, Executive Director of the Natural Resources Defense
Council; Jay Hair, President of the National Wildlife Federation; and James Stock, Secretary
for Environmental Protection of the State of California. Id.
88. Kelly, supra note 11, at 385.
89. Voigt, supra note 38, at 339.
90. North American Free Trade Agreement, Hearings before the Committee on
Agriculture, U.S. House of Representatives, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (testimony of Carol
Browner, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency) [hereinafter, NAFTA
Hearings, Browner Testimony].

91.
92.
93.
94.

See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes

97-i02
103-12
113-34
135-42

and
and
and
and

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
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addresses Article 1114 because this provision incorporates environmental
issues into investment activities.9" Lastly, it considers Chapter 20 because
this provision provides for a dispute resolution process.96
A.

The Preamble

The environment is first mentioned in NAFTA's preamble, which states
the overall environmental objectives of the party-nations. First, the preamble
commits the signing parties to promote to undertake NAFTA activities "in
a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation." 97 This
provision challenges the signing parties to consider the environment while
attempting to achieve trade liberalization and expanded growth. 98 In
addition, the preamble sets forth the resolve to "strengthen the development
and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations."99 While not
specifically requiring the enforcement of laws, the preamble emphasizes that
environmental protection is a complimentary commitment that supports the
economic provisions." 0
B. Article 104
The next mention of environmental concerns in NAFTA is in Article 104.
Article 104 anticipates probable conflicts between NAFTA and current
existing environmental agreements, and preserves the force of the prior
treaties agreements.1 ' The article specifically mentions three treaties: (1)
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora; (2) the Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone
Layer; and (3) the Basel Convention. 0 2 This provision is crucial because
the cited environmental agreements utilize trade measures to enforce
environmental obligations.0 3 A signing party may therefore impose trade
sanctions allowed under these prior agreements that would otherwise be
counter to NAFTA rules.1°4
Article 104 is limited in scope in two important respects. First, specific

95. See infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
97. NAFTA, supra note I, at Preamble.
98. Gaines, supra note 84, at 202.
99. NAFTA, supra note 1,at Preamble.
100. Gaines, supra note 84, at 203.
101. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 104.
102. Id. Included is a clause which gives the same effect to bilateral agreements between
the United States and Mexico, and the United States and Canada governing transportation of
hazardous waste because the Basel Convention is not ratified in the United States. Gaines,
supra note 60, at 203.
103. Gaines, supra note 84, at 203.
104. NAFTA HearingsBrowner Testimony, supra note 90.
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environmental obligations of all prior agreements are not incorporated into
NAFTA10 5 Had these provisions been incorporated into the trade agreement, they would allow enforcement under NAFTA. °6 However, Article
104 states that a "specific trade obligation" of an environmental agreement
must conflict with NAFTA obligations before it will be given
precedence." 7 Because previous environmental agreements contain few
trade obligations, most environmental situations are unlikely to require that
deference be given to environmental agreements.'0 8 One such situation
may involve the transportation of transboundary waste.
Second, when a choice exists among equally effective and reasonably
available trade measures, the environmental obligation prevails only if it is
the least inconsistent with NAFTA obligations. 9 Therefore, a signing
party must choose a measure most compatibre with free trade." 0 A word
such as "reasonable" is broad enough to force a party to choose an alternative
to an environmental obligation.
C.

Chapter 7

Another NAFTA provision particularly sensitive to the conflicting goals
of free trade and environmental protection is Chapter 7 of NAFTA. Chapter
7 governs sanitary and phytosanitary measures."' The signing parties
required that NAFTA strike a balance between protecting health and the
environment, while preventing purely protectionistic acts." 2 A signing
party may "establish its own level of protection" to protect "human, animal,
or plant life or health through a risk assessment process.""' 3 NAFTA thus
favors national autonomy over international standards. It allows each country
to establish its own standards when that nation recognizes some harm will

105. Voigt, supra note 38, at 341.
106. Id.
107. NAFTA, supra note 1,at art. 104.
108. Id.
109. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 104.
110. Lerner, supra note 10, at 262.
111. Gaines, supra note 84, at 204. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures include meat
inspection at processing facilities, quarantines of products arriving from infested areas, healthbased prohibitions on particular food, and pesticide regulation. Id. at 203.
112. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 712(2). Each signing party may apply standards which are
more stringent than international standards. Id. art. 712(1). NAFTA allows the use of international standards if those standards achieve U.S. levels of protection and there is no reduction
in the level of health, safety or environmental protection. NAFTA Hearings Browner
Testimony, supra note 90.
113. NAFTA, supra note 1,art. 712(2). Risk assessment is the use of scientific data to
define the probability of some harm coming to an individual or a population because of
exposure to a substance or situation. Russell & Gruber, Risk Assessment in Environmental
Policy Making, 236 SCIENCE 286, 292 (1987).
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result if the standards are not adopted.
Chapter 7's provisions are qualified by four disciplines. First, the signing
party's regulation must be "based on scientific principles" and it will not be
sustained once there is no longer a "scientific basis" for it." 4 Second, the
regulations cannot "arbitrarily or unjustifiably" discriminate between like
goods." 5 Third, in order to prevent "unnecessary obstacles to trade,
measures should be applied only to the extent necessary to achieve its
appropriate level of protection."'1 6 Last, measures may not be applied with
7
the intent or effect of creating a disguised restriction on trade."
Environmentalists have voiced a pair of concerns about Chapter 7's
terminology. First, the signing parties defined the term "scientific basis" to
mean any reason based on scientific data or information using scientific
methods."' The signing parties adopted this definition so that a particular
measure would not be struck down by the existence of a competing scientific
measure." 9 However, environmentalists contend that the threshold of
requiring a scientific basis is too high because it does not recognize
environmental standards when scientific uncertainty exists. 120 They fear
that significant damage will occur before countries are able to justify
21
environmental standards.'
Environmentalists also express concern regarding the phrase "only to the
extent necessary,"'' 22 because it may be interpreted to mean that an adopted
environmental measure may be challenged if a less restrictive trade measure
could accomplish the same results. 23 This fear was realized when GATT
interpreted "necessary" to mean "least trade restrictive."' 2 4 Proponents of
NAFTA, however, state the plain meaning of the text provides another
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

NAFTA, supra note 1,art. 712(3)(a) &(b).
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 712(4).
Id. art. 712(5).
Id. art. 712(6).
Gaines, supra note 84, at 206.
Id.
Greenpeace Policy Brief, NAFTA & the North American Agreement on Environmen-

tal Cooperation: Side-Stepping the Environment (1993)(on file with the author)[hereinafter
Greenpeace Policy Brief]. NAFTA could include the "precautionary principle" as the test for
regulating environmental threats. Id. The "precautionary principle" is used in decision

making when scientific uncertainty exists regarding the effects of an activity on the
environment. M.P.A. Kindall, UNCED and the Evolution of Principles of International
EnvironmentalLaw, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 19, 23 (1991). "Precautionary principle" is not

consistently defined and ranges from requiring only a casual link between emissions and a
"likely harm" to irreversible damage requiring some type of prevention. Id.
121. Greenpeace Policy Brief, supra note 120.
122. Gaines, supra note 84, at 207.
123. Id.
124. Friends of the Earth, Memorandum of Provisions to. Include in the Environmental
Supplemental Agreement (Mar. 1993) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Friends of the
Earth].
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

13

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 8

[Vol. 8

interpretation. 25 A level of protection is first established, which may
include zero-risk, through a risk assessment process, and then an environmental measure is designed to attain that level of protection. 26 If a stricter
measure were adopted than was necessary to achieve a particular level of
protection, then that measure would be subject to challenge.1 27
This provision may significantly affect the current "Circle of Poison"
problem. The "Circle of Poison" is a term used to describe the circular route
traveled by pesticides banned in the United States when they are legally
exported and then returned legally on imported fruits and vegetables. 2 s To
alleviate this fear, the United States proposes to test agriculturai products that
enter the country from abroad for residue of banned pesticides. This testing
specifically with U.S. trading partners which use
procedure would be used
29
substance.
banned
the
As an illustration, the United States may set a standard for strawberries
sprayed with a certain carcinogenic pesticide at zero-risk. This standard
would be acceptable provided the United States demonstrated that this level
of protection were necessary. According to NAFTA proponents, the United
States then could forbid the importation of any strawberries containing this
pesticide and withstand a trade barrier challenge under NAFTA. 3 ° This
may be an unrealistic goal, however, because of the high volume of
agricultural products expected to enter the United States under NAFTA.''
In addition, environmentalists contend NAFTA addresses only one symptom
32
of a more prevalent problem of unsustainable agricultural production.
D. Chapter 9
If a product is not classified as sanitary or phytosanitary then it is
governed by another NAFTA provision, Chapter 9 on Standards-Related
Measures. 3 3 NAFTA's supporters contend that the treaty maintains each

125. Gaines, supra note 84, at 205.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 205-206.
128. U.S. Pesticide Exports and the Circle of Poison: Hearing on the Economic Policy,
Trade and Environment Subcommittee of the House ForeignAffairs Committee, 103rd Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1994) (testimony of Representative Gejdensen) [hereinafter Pesticide Hearings].
129. Id. (testimony of Carol Browner, Administrator of the EPA). Congressional leaders
are also considering amending U.S. laws to impose a total ban on exporting pesticides banned
in this country. Id.
130. Gaines, supra note 84, at 206.
131. Feeley & Knier, supra note 12, at 269.
132. Greenpeace Policy Brief, supra note 120.
133. NAFTA, supra note i, art. 904(1) declares:

Each Party may, in accordance with this Agreement, adopt, maintain and apply
standards-related measures, including those relating to safety, the protection of
human, animal and plant life and health, the environment, and consumers, and
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss3/8
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signatory party's own stringent environmental standards, while encouraging
other party-nations to strengthen their internal policies. 34 Most of the
same rights and disciplines apply to standard-related measures as to sanitary
and phytosanitary.
Under Chapter 9, each party may adopt and maintain its own level of
environmental protection in pursuing legitimate objectives by adopting any
standards-related measure. 35 However, a party may not establish standards
which create an unnecessary obstacle to trade.' 36 NAFTA does not
comprehensively define a "legitimate objective," but provides an illustrative
37
list which expressly excludes the protection of domestic production.'
However, environmentalists express concern because Chapter 9 does not
This is
include process methods, in its list of legitimate objectives. 3
significant omission because a complaining party may choose to settle
environmental disputes under GATT instead of NAFTA.' 3 9 Process
methods were excluded as legitimate objectives when GATT recently
determined that like products require equal treatment regardless of how they
are produced. 4 '
E.

Article 1114

NAFTA has broken significant environmental ground in one respect. For
the first time, a trade agreement provision exists which addresses environmental aspects of investment."' Article 1114 of NAFTA states that a party
"may adopt any measure ... to ensure that investment activity ... [is]

measures to ensure their enforcement, or implementation. Such measures include
those to prohibit the importation of a good of another Party or the provision of a
service by a service provider of another Party that fails to comply with the
applicable requirements of such measures or to complete its approval procedures.
134. Duffy, supra note 46, at 587.
135. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 904(1). Such measures may include the prohibition of a
good from another country. Id.
136. Id. art. 904(4). "[A]n unnecessary obstacle to trade shall not be deemed to be created
where: (a) the demonstrable purpose of the measure is to achieve a legitimate objective." Id.
137. Id. art. 915: Definitions.
138. Id. Legitimate objectives include "safety, protection of human, animal or plant life
or health, the environment ... , and sustainable development, considering ... geographical
factors, technological or infrastructural factors, or scientific justification." Id.
139. Id. art. 2005. This article allows the United States to bring a GATT challenge if
another country seeks to protect an environmental resource outside of its territorial jurisdiction.

Environmental Implications of NAFTA and the Opportunity to Advance Sustainable Trading
Practices:HearingsBefore the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (testimony of Rodger Schlickeisen, President of Defenders of Wildlife)
[hereinafter Defenders of Wildlife].
140. Feeley & Knier, supra note 12, at 271.
141. NAFTA Hearings, Browner Testimony, supra note 90.
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sensitive to environmental concerns.' 4 2 Thus, a signing party may require
the preparation of an environmental impact statement before approval of
investment activity. The generality of this provision, however, brings into
question its practicability.
Article 1114 recognizes that "it is inappropriate to encourage investment
by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures.' ' 43 The
drafters of NAFTA inserted this provision to dissuade the creation of
"pollution havens" where companies may relocate to avoid strict environmental laws.'" Unfortunately, the drafters failed to insert the word "shall" into
the provision, and thus its language lacks a legally binding force.
If a party believes that a country has encouraged investors through a
"relaxing of environmental measures," then Article 1114(2) mandates
consultation. 45 It is unclear, however, what recourse remains if the
consultation is unsatisfactory.4 6 In addition, border problems involve lax
enforcement of existing laws, not the lowering of standards to attract
investment. 47 The provision's language is ambiguous as to whether nonenforcement is included in the category of the "relaxing of environmental
measures."
F. Chapter 20
A final NAFTA provision associated with environmental concerns is
Chapter 20, which defines the procedure for resolution under NAFTA of all
disputes except antidumping and countervailing duty cases. 148 This dispute
process can be broken down into three steps; - a consultation between the
disputing parties, followed by a review by the Free Trade Commission, and
finally, a review by an arbitral panel. 49 The arbitral panel is granted
access to scientific information and data from any person it deems appropriate or through a written request to a scientific review board.'" Both
the scientific review board's reports and the disputing party's evidence should
be considered by the arbitral panel.' 5'
Two provisions of Chapter 20 specifically apply to environmental issues.
First, the party asserting that an environmental measure is inconsistent with

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1114(1).
Id. art. 1114(2).
Gaines, supra note 84, at 208.
Id. at 207-208.
Voigt, supra note 38, at 349.
Id. at 348-349.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2001.
Id. art. 2005.
Id.
Id.
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NAFTA has the burden of proof.152 This requires the complaining party
to prove that an environmental measure is both discriminatory and not based
on scientific proof. 5 3 Second, for environmentally sensitive disputes, the
responding party can compel settlement of the dispute under NAFTA
auspices.154 This provision was included to prevent parties from circumventing NAFTA's favorable provisions by bringing their cases in the
55
GATT.1
One of the most convincing criticisms of NAFTA by both environmental
and congressional leaders is its lack of any enforcement power.156 Concerned with the lax enforcement of Mexico's laws, Congress considered
enforcement a "key provision" to ensuring the clean up of the border
area. 5"' 7 Senator Baucas stated that the agreement should provide for trade
sanctions when persistent non-enforcement of existing environmental laws
one party a competitive edge. 58 In response to this criticism, President
Clinton emphasized that the Environmental Side Agreement would guarantee
that each signing party enforce its own environmental laws.159
V. THE ENVIRONMENTAL SIDE AGREEMENT
The purpose of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (Side Agreement) is to ensure that economic growth is
"consistent with goals of sustainable development."' 60 Carol Browner,
Administrator of the EPA, proclaimed that all three countries will benefit
under NAFTA and its Environmental Side Agreement.' 61 Senator Baucas
fully endorsed NAFTA after the side agreement was negotiated. 162 However, critics still express concern that this agreement is not as effective as
NAFTA supporters contend.

152. Id. art. 723(6) & 914(4).
153. NAFTA Hearings, Browner Testimony, supra note 90.
154. NAFTA, supra note 1,art. 2005(3) & (4).
155. Gaines, supra note 84, at 209.
156. CongressExamines NAFTA Provisionsto EnsureEnforcement of EnvironmentalLaws,
ENVT'L REP. (BNA)(Sept. 25, 1992). Rep. Robert Matsui (D-Calif) comments that the trade
agreement "needs an environmental hammer clause" to provide the U.S. leverage when
negotiating enforcement of environmental laws. Id.
157. NAFTA and The Environment: Hearing of the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee, FED. NEWS SERV., Mar. 15, 1993 (testimony of Senator Baucas).
158. Id.
159. Houseman, et al., Enforcement of Environmental Laws under a Supplemental
Agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 593,
597 (1993).
160. Memorandum .from the Office of the United States Trade Representative, NAFTA
Supplement: Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (1993) (on file with the author).
161. NAFTA Hearings, Browner Testimony, supra note 90.
162. Conference with Gore, supra note 7.
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The first criticism of the Environmental Side Agreement is its lack of a
legal link to NAFTA.'6 3 The problem perceived by environmentalists is
that parties to NAFTA do not have to honor the Agreement in order to enjoy
the benefits of NAFTA. 1"
The NAFTA and the Environmental Side
Agreement are free-standing international agreements between the three countries.16
Therefore, withdrawal from the side agreement or failure to
comply with its terms does not result in any action under NAFTA.'
The
irony then, is that NAFTA opponents claimed they would not vote for
NAFTA without a valid, enforceable environmental side agreement, yet they
ultimately approved the same treaty they originally opposed, accompanied by
an unenforceable side bargain.
A.

Organization/Function

The Side Agreement's primary objective is cooperation between the three
countries to promote sustainable development and enhancement of the
environment, while seeking to "avoid trade barriers."167 The objectives are
vague principles that rarely use strong words except when dealing with trade
68
distortion or barrier.
The obligations of each signing party are delineated in Article 2.169
Each party shall, with respect to its territory, "periodically prepare" reports,
"promote education", "further research", "assess environmental impacts", and
"promote the use of economic instruments" for the "achievement of
environmental goals."' 70 Second, each party shall consider any Council
recommendation.' Third, each party shall consider "prohibiting the export
...of a pesticide or toxic substance whose use is prohibited within that
Party's territory." The mandatory 'obligations in this provision involve

163. Peter Behr & Thomas B. Edsall, Clinton Concedes Point on NAFTA Side Pacts, THE
WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1993, at G2. The Clinton administration admitted that the United
States would not be obliged to drop out of the NAFTA if either Canada or Mexico withdrew
from the environmental side agreement. Id.
164. Can the Labor Side Agreement Save NAFTA? The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), Labor and Environmental "Side" Agreements, Hearings Before the
House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Employment, Housing and
Aviation, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1993) (statement of Lori M. Wallach, Director Trade
Program, Public Citizen Watch) [hereinafter Wallach Testimony] (on file with the author).
165. Id.
166. Id. Lori Wallach states possible action would include expulsion from NAFTA or
termination of NAFTA benefits. Id.
167. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Nov., 1993, U.S.-Can.Mex., art. I Objectives [hereinafter Agreement].
168. Id.
169. Id. art. 2.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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education and information gathering. The parties need only consider whether
to implement the council environmental recommendations and banning the
exportation of harmful pesticides.
The Side Agreement creates a new Commission on Environmental
Cooperation, consisting of a Council, a Secretariat, and a Joint Public
Advisory Committee. 72 The Council, composed of environmental leaders
from each country, functions as a forum for discussing environmental issues
and recommending solutions for environmental disputes. 7 3 Beneath the
Council is the Secretariat, composed of a staff from all three countries, whose
main function is to identify environmental problems.' 74 In preparing its
reports, the Secretariat may use information obtained by a Joint Advisory
Committee composed of nongovernmental organizations from all three
The Secretariat's reports will continuously monitor the
countries.175
environmental effects of NAFTA to ensure it proceeds in an environmentally
safe manner. 176 After the Secretariat submits its reports to the Council,
they may be made available to the public. 177 Environmentalists assert this
"watchdog for the environment is chained and has no teeth."'7 8
Many environmentalists criticize this Agreement as not fully realizing
environmental issues. This criticism may be divided into four groups. First,
the agreement may not contain adequate enforcement power. Second, the
dispute resolution process may be too lengthy and arduous. Third, the
provisions for citizen participation may not be effective. Fourth, U.S.
environmental regulations may be lowered as a result of this agreement.
B.

Enforcement

According to NAFTA supporters, the Side Agreement will "strengthen
'
thereby alleviating the foremost
national enforcement of national laws,"179
8
0
While the United States determined that
complaint of NAFTA's critics.
some of Mexico's laws were on par with the U.S' laws, it also discovered
Even though Mexico
that enforcement of those laws was nonexistent.'

172. Id. art. 8.
173. Id. art. 9 & 10.
174. Id. art. 11. The Secretariat shall submit environmental reports for review by the
Council. Id.
175. Id. art. (2)(c).
176. •NAFTA Hearings, Browner Testimony, supra note 90.
177. Agreement, supra note 169, art. 13(3). "The Secretariat shall submit its report to the
Council, which shall make it publicly available, normally within 60 days following its submission, UNLESS the Council otherwise decides." Id.
178. Greenpeace Policy Brief, supra note 120..
179. NAFTA Hearings, Browner Testimony, supra note 90.
180. Houseman, et. al., supra note 159, at 593.
181. Id. at 594.
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enacted tougher environmental laws, yet they continue to be violated by
many small businesses and industries.1 82 The recent rush by Mexico to
prove it will not become a pollution haven is viewed by many opponents as
merely a device to facilitate passage of NAFTA.' 83
The Side Agreement's enforcement process is triggered when "there has
been a persistent pattern of failure by [a] party to effectively enforce its
environmental laws."'" Environmentalists assert the use of the term
"persistent pattern" will make it difficult for protesting parties to qualify for
the enforcement process. 85 "Persistent pattern" is defined as a "sustained
or recurring course of action or inaction."' 86 The number of times a party
must fail to enforce its laws and the duration necessary to constitute
"persistent" are open to interpretation.'87 However, it will almost certainly
require more than once, as the Labor agreement defines a pattern as several
88
events.1
Furthermore, the Agreement recognizes several exceptions for the country
which fails to "effectively enforce" its laws.' 89 An exception is granted if
the failure to comply "reflects a reasonable exercise of discretion" or "results
from bona fide decisions to allocate resources ... determined to have higher
priorities."' 90 This provision affords elevated respect toward national
sovereignty. If a nation asserts that its degree of compliance with environmental standards is a reasonable exercise of its discretion, then a challenge
would be inappropriate. Furthermore, the offending party may avoid a
challenge under the Agreement if it asserts that its resources are better used
for other interests. This exception is expansive in that a nation can simply
assert a bona fide decision to allocate resources to matters other than
enforcement.'19
The Side Agreement also offers leeway to a nation which fails to enforce
its environmental laws by excluding from the Commission's purview review

182. Robberson, supra note 49, at A36.
183. Loftis, supra note 45. Santiago Onate Laborde, Mexico's Attorney General for
Environmental Protection claims inspectors have doubled, dumps are being cleaned, and air
pollution rules are expanding. Id. Critics comment these efforts are "hype" to initiate passage
of NAFTA. Id.In Tiajuana a toxic dump containing 22,000 tons of toxic powdery lead sits
untouched after officials ordered a:cleanup order seven months ago. Id.
184. Agreement, supra note 167, art. 22(l).
185. Wallach Testimony, supra note 164, at 7.
186. Agreement, supra note 167, art. 45: Definitions.
187. Wallach Testimony, supra note 164, at 7.
188. Id.
189. Agreement, supra note 167, art. 45: Definitions.
190. Id.
191. Wallach Testimony, supra note 164, at 7.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss3/8

20

1993]

ENVIRONMENTAL 'SIDEAGREEMENT

DuPuis: The Environmental Side Agreement Between Mexico and the United St

of laws governing natural resources.'

92

Critics of NAFTA see the complete

failure to address natural resources as a potential source of substantial
environmental damage.' 93 Even' more alarming, they (Critics) believe
NAFTA may be used as vehicle to attack resource conservation plans that are
considered barriers to trade."
Only existing environmental laws are considered reviewable by the
Commission. Most NAFTA supporters assert that because Mexico and the
United States have comparable environmental laws the primary problem is
enforcement. This assertion, however, is not entirely true. Not all of
Mexico's laws are comparable to U.S. laws. For example, a debate exists
over two coal-fired electrical plants (Carbon I and II) in Piedras Negras,
Mexico.195 Carbon I and II emit over 230,000 tons of sulfur dioxide into
Big Bend, Texas each year. 96 Even though they are not fitted with antipollution devices such as smoke scrubbers, they still meet Mexican
standards.' 97 The United States, however, could not challenge Mexico
under the Agreement because Mexico is not failing to enforce its existing
environmental laws. However, if cross- boundary trade were involved it may
be subject to NAFTA's environmental provisions.' 9 This would require
two unlikely acts - that 'Mexico either buy U.S. coal or sell the U.S.
electricity.' 99 Neither of these acts are foreseeable, however, and thus the
Side Agreement will not effectively address this situation.
Finally, this provision is problematic because it does not allow
enforcement of upgraded environmental standards. If a party fails to
implement a regulation, the provision does not allow for sanctions.20 0
Therefore, by simply not implementing a regulation a party-nation can
192. Agreement, supra note 167, art. 14(1) and Part Five. " 'Environmental Law' means
any statute or regulation of a party.... the primary purpose of which is the protection of the
environment, or the prevention of a danger to human life or health," but does not include "any
statute or regulation the primary purpose of which is managing commercial... exploitation
or subsistence ... of natural resources." Id. art. 45: Definitions.

193. Greenpeace Policy Brief, supra note 120, at 4. The Commission would not review
harvesting of old growth forests, strip mining, transfers of water resources, destruction of
coastal fisheries, and large energy projects which destroy ecosystems. Id.
194. Id. at 5.
195. Todd Robberson, Cloud Over Trade Pact- Texas Too; Mexican PollutionFuels U.S.
Criticism, THE WASH. POST, June 22, 1993, at Al.

196. Id.
197. Id. Thomas Reed, Project Director for Carbon II admitted that his company was not
willing to spend the $200 - $300 million dollars necessary to add anti-pollution devices to the
plant when it meets Mexican standards. Id. EPA officials stated that Mexico's standards for
coal-burning power plants are not equivalent to current U.S. standards, but rather U.S.
standards of 1970. Id.
198. John Simpson, NAFTA Negotiations Boost Scrutiny of U.S. Mexico Power Projects,

131 No. 18 FORT. 42 (1993).
199. Id.
200. Greenpeace Policy Brief, supra note 120, at 2.
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minimize the risk of trade sanctions.201
C.

The Dispute Resolution Process

Another area of contention in the Side Agreement invol.ves ,the dispute
resolution process. The process has been described as onerous and its
ineffectiveness was used by Mexican trade negotiator Jaime Serra Puche to
ease concerns of trade sanctions in the Mexican Congress.2 2 The proce
dure is lengthy and requires a two thirds vote to advance through the review
process. Consultation and Resolution of Disputes is governed by Part Five
of the Agreement. 2 3 Any signing party may initiate a.consultation by
written request when a pattern of nonenforcement arises. 2" If the informal
consultation is unsatisfactory, a signing party may request a meeting of the
Council. 2 5 If the issue is not resolved by the Council, then a signing party
may request an arbitral panel.20 6 However, the Council will grant the
request for a panel only upon a two-thirds vote and under certain conditions. 207
Once selected by the disputing parties, 208 panelists prepare a finding of
fact report.20 9 If this report includes an "affirmative finding of a persistent
patterrr of nonenforcement," the parties are first instructed to develop an
"Action Plan." 210 If the Action Plan is ineffectual, then the panel may

201. Id.
202. Wallach Testimony, supra note 164, at 4.

In an apparent attempt to address concerns about national sovereignty and the
amount of fines that may accrue to Mexico under the agreement, Mr. Serra Puche
emphasized the limited scope of the trilateral commission's powers, and the lengthy
and complex process needed to reach and implement enforcement recommendations.
"The time frame of the process makes it very improbable that the stage of sanction
could be reached," he said.
Id. (quoting JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Aug. 20, 1993).
203. Agreement, supra note 167, at Part 5.
204. Id. art. 22.
205. Id. art. 23.
206. Id. art. 24.
207. Id. art. 24(1). The disputed issues must "relate to a situation involving workplaces,
firms, companies or sectors that produce goods or provide services:
a) traded between the territories of the Parties;
or
b) that compete, in the territory of the Party complained against, with goods or services
produced or provided by persons of another Party." Id.
208. Id. art. 25: Roster. The parties choose from a roster composed of individuals who
meet certain criteria and have the willingness to serve as panelists. Id.
209. Id. art. 31(2). The initial report contains findings of fact, a determination of whether
there is a persistent pattern of nonenforcement, and its recommendations, if any, as to a
resolution. Id.
210. Id. art. 33.
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" ' and after another lengthy procedure, may suspend
assess a monetary fine 21
trade benefits under NAFTA.
The whole process, provided the parties do not agree to extend the time
limits, takes approximately eighteen months to levy a fine and over two years
to suspend trade benefits. Some consider this too long of a period to be
effective. The Clinton administration, however, merely guaranteed that the
Agreement would provide for trade sanctions; it did not specify any time
requirements.2 13
In support of the Side Agreement, it is monumental to have any
enforcement of environmental standards available,, given that Mexico
expressly stated it would not accept an Agreement with enforcement
powers. 2" Furthermore, the idea behind trade sanctions is to compel
certain behavior, not to collect fines from Mexico. 21 5 As long as the
possibility exists that one country may enforce trade sanctions against a noncomplying country, it should help ensure enforcement Of environmental
216
laws.

D. Citizen Participation
Environmentalists also contend that citizens are not effectively empowered to bring suits against Parties for noncompliance.217 Supporters of
NAFTA contend that the Side Agreement "promotes public participation and
transparency in the development and implementation of environmental
laws. 21 s Private parties are ensured a right to judicial proceedings and
access to remedies if they have a legally recognized interest under a nation's
law. 219 Citizens are also granted a limited right to force environmental
compliance under the Side Agreement.22 °

211. Id. art. 33(4)(b). The fine shall not exceed $20 million the first year, and no more
than .007 percent of total trade in goods in future years. Id. at Annex 34: Monetary
Enforcement. The money is to be expended at the direction of the Council to improve or
enhance the environment of the Party complained against consistent with its law. Id. at Annex
34.
212. Id. art. 36. NAFTA benefits are suspended if the offending Party does not comply
with the Council's recommendation and pay the required fine. Id.
213. Sanctions Allowed Against US., Mexico, Fines For Canada UnderEnvironment Pact,
16 INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) No. 17, 16 (Aug. 25, 1993).
214. Bob Davis, Clash Looms Over Scope of NAFTA Panel, WALL ST. J. at AlO, Jan. 28,
1993, at A10.
215. Defenders of Wildlife, supra note 139.
216. Id.
217. NAFTA: Hearings before the Senate Finance Committee, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (testimony of Michael McCloskey, Chairman Sierra Club).
218. NAFTA Hearings,Browner Testimony, supra note 90.
219. Agreement, supra note 167, art. 6: Private Access to Remedies.
220. Id. art. 14: Submissions on Enforcement Matters.
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Some environmentalists believe, however, that the process allowing
private parties to bring suit under Article 14 is too inaccessible and
complicated. 22' The process begins when a private citizen submits for the
Secretariat's review a written request asserting that a party is "failing to
effectively enforce its environmental laws. 2 22 The Secretariat determines
if the written request contains sufficient evidence, promotes enforcement
rather than harassing industry, and indicates that the matter was communicated to the offending party.22 3 In addition, the submission must allege harm
and further the goals of the Agreement. 24 If the submission meets all the
criteria, then the Secretariat prepares a factual record and submits it to the
Council, which may publish it after a two-thirds vote. 225 There is no
provision allowing the NGO a right to know why their request was not
reviewed or any requirement that the submissions be documented. 2 6
In order to meet these standards, a private citizen will need a significant
amount of resources to obtain documentation to support a claim. Also,
notification of the offending party may require courage.22 7 Some Mexicans
may fear a challenge of its government's policies may bring reprisals. 2 8
Citizen suits are considered an effective means to advance environmental
protection. 129 The Side Agreement allows citizens that reside in the
offending nation's territory to institute an action under the Agreement.23 °
It does not, however, allow cross-border citizen suits, which may be more
effective because citizens of all NAFTA governments would monitor each
other's compliance. 2 3' As drafted, the Side Agreement intrudes less on
Mexico's sovereignty and thus probably represents a fair compromise. In
addition, the Side Agreement relinquishes more sovereignty than the
European Community, where most enforcement suits are limited to the
government.232

221. Wallach Testimony, supra note 164, at 5.
222. Agreement, supra note 167, art. 14.

223. Id. The private citizen group must be clearly identified and also reside in the territory
of the offending Party. Id.
224. Housman, et al., supra note 159, at 612.

225. Id.
226. Agreement, supra note 167, art. 14(2). The citizen must also have exhausted private
remedies. Id.
227. Id. art. 15(7). Provided the matter is not currently pending, or the subject of past
domestic proceedings, or private remedies are available then the Secretariat will prepare a
factual record. Id.
228. Wallach Testimony, supra note 164, at 8.
229. Housman, et al., supra note 159, at 608.
230. Agreement, supra note 167, art. 14(l)(f).
231. Housman, et al., supra note 159, at 608.
232. Reed D. Rubinstein, Timothy M. Wittebort, Environmental Law and Foreign
Investment in the United States and in the EEC: A Practitioner'sGuide, 69 MICH. B.J. 642,
648 (1990).
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The Side Agreement takes commendable steps toward public participation
by allowing the public to request an enforcement proceeding and submit
information for inclusion in Secretariat Reports.233 However, public
citizens are only allowed a limited and informal review. 234 Further, this
review must meet stringent criteria, and if granted the results may not be
published.2 35
E. Standards
Environmentalists also criticize the Side Agreement for failing to
expressly state that countries are not permitted to' lower their environmental
standards. 236 The Side Agreement states that each country shall strive to
establish high levels of environmental protection and continue to improve
those standards.237 However, there is no provision in the Side Agreement
which specifically prohibits a country from lowering its standards. 238 In
addition, the Side Agreement provides no mechanism for enforcement should
a country choose to lower its environmental laws. 239 This is problematic
because the United States may not be able to prohibit goods from entering
the country which do not meet its level of environmental protection.24 °
Free trade agreements in the past have resulted in a reduction of environmental standards, even when countries have similar levels of industrialization.24' For example, when the EPA sought to ban imported
products containing asbestos, Canada challenged the measure under a U.S.Canada Agreement.242 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
the ban an invalid trade measure because the EPA did not consider less
burdensome alternatives. 243 Thus, social and economic pressures under a free
trade agreement compel a downward shifting of environmental standards.
Environmentalists fear that because Mexico's environmental obligations
are significantly lower than the United States, the United States will be
pressured to lower its standards.2 44 A recent GATT decision proclaimed
that the United States cannot prohibit the import of tuna from Mexico

233. Defenders of Wildlife, supra note 139.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Wallach Testimony, supra note 164, at 13.
237. Agreement, supra note 167, art. 3: Levels of Protection.
238. Wallach Testimony, supra note 164, at 13.
239. Id.
240. Feeley & Knier, supra note 12, at 269.
241. Id.
242. Warren E. Leary, Appeals Court Strikes Down Major Partsof FederalAsbestos Ban,
THE N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1991, at A20.
243. Id.
244. Feeley & Knier, supra note 12, at 270-71.
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because the prohibition would violate GATT.245 The United States
contended that the method Mexico employed to catch the tuna resulted in a
high rate of dolphin mortality and thus violated the Marine Mammal
Protection Act. 2' The GATT panel decided that unless the imported tuna
directly caused harm to the United States, the United States could not legally
restrict its importation under GATT.247 It held that GATT requires equal
treatment of like products regardless of the production method.248
Under this equal treatment standard, a country may only use a trade
measure to protect its own territory. 249 The Side Agreement does not allow
for protection of the ocean, biological diversity, or endangered species.25 °
In addition, if the United States refuses a product because Mexico destroyed
a natural resource in the production of that product, the United States will be
in violation of GATT and perhaps NAFTA.
Applying this ruling to a future situation under NAFTA, the Defenders
of Wildlife mention Chile's fishing industry practices. 21 Defenders seek
to prevent Chile's current practice of slaughtering numerous marine mammals
25 2
for crab bait by prohibiting the import of crab into the United States
However, this challenge may run counter to NAFTA, and thus, be prohibited.

253

VI.

CONCLUSION

While neither NAFTA nor its Environmental Side Agreement effectively
deal with all possible environmental concerns, the two treaties will probably
promote environmental consciousness. NAFTA and its Environmental Side
Agreement represent a compromise between a country's right to sovereignty
and the outside enforcement of its environmental laws. Many environmental
groups support NAFTA, stating
that the global environment will be better off
254
it.
without
than
NAFTA
with
NAFTA will provide Mexico with much needed economic resources,
which in turn could enable it to improve enforcement of its environmental
laws. Whether Mexico spends its increased revenue on the environment,
however, remains to be seen. NAFTA does provide an enforcement

245. Id.

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Defenders of Wildlife, supra note 139.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
254. Conference with Gore, supra note 7, (testimony of Kathryn Fuller, World Wildlife
Fund).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss3/8

26

1993]

ENVIRONMENTAL SIDE AGREEMENT

DuPuis: The Environmental Side Agreement Between Mexico and the United St

mechanism not currently available under the La Paz Agreement. Recently,
the United States and Mexico jointly investigated and prosecuted illegal
transportation of hazardous waste from the United States into Mexico."'
However, NAFTA sadly lacks a provision for the protection of natural
resources. In addition, much of its language is broad, ambiguous, and
subject to interpretation.

255. 16-month Term Given On Hazardous Waste Conviction, 24 THE ENV'T REP. (BNA)
No. 34 (Dec. 24, 1993). The President of a lead smeltering plant in Tiajuana, Mexico was
sentenced to 16 months in prison and fined $2.5 million for transboundary transportation of
hazardous waste. Id.
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